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NOTES
Deferred Compensation Arrangements Under Section 83
of the Internal Revenue Code: Is Restricted Property
Still a Viable Means of Compensation?
When faced with the problem of compensating key executives,
employers have tended to avoid the exclusive use of current cash
compensation, since this would result in an immediate and substantial income tax to highly paid employees. Deferred compensation
plans have been utilized in order to maximize tax benefits for employees, such as deferred recognition of income and capital gains
treatment.1 Although such plans are structured to meet the needs
of the particular employer and employee, several forms of deferred
compensation are common. Among these are qualified and unqualified pension, profit-sharing, and stock bonus plans; qualified, restricted,2 and employee stock purchase plans (the so-called statutory
stock options); nonstatutory stock options;3 and the transfer of restricted property. This Note will be limited to an analysis of the
new section 834 of the Internal Revenue Code, which was intended
to eliminate the capricious variations in ta."{ consequences that have
accompanied the transfer of restricted property as compensation for
over twenty-five years. 5
Prior to the Tax Reform Act of 1969,6 the rules respecting the
receipt of restricted property were contained in the Treasury Regulations relating to the law of nonstatutory stock options;7 the Code
itself was silent on the point. The establishment of these rules was,
in part, a response to the Tax Court's decision in Robert Lehman.8
In that case petitioner was a partner in the firm of Lehman Brothers, which had received stock options that it exercised in February
1943. The parties agreed that the acquisition of the shares did not
give rise to any income in 1943 because they had no ascertainable
1. See generally Buchhelder, Executive Compensation After the Tax Reform Act
of 1969, 48 TAXES 652 (1970); Kelsey &: Buckheit, The Impact of the Tax Reform Act
of 1969 on Executive Compensation, 4 IND. LEGAL F. 246 (1970).
2. INT. REv. CoDE OF 1954, § 424(b) limits the availability of restricted stock options
to plans or contracts adopted before January 1, 1964.
3. A "nonstatutory stock option" is an option which does not meet the statutory
requirements' of § 42l(a), INT. REv. CODE OF 1954.
4. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 83, added by Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No.
91-172, § 32l(a), 83 Stat. 487.
5. See HOUSE CO!',IM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 91ST CONG., 1ST Sl:SS., TAX REFORM
PROPOSALS 60 (Comm. Print. 1969) (statement of Assistant Secretary of the Treasury
E.S. Cohen).
6. Pub. L. No. 91-172, 83 Stat. 487.
7. Treas. Reg. §§ l.61-2(d)(5), l.421-6(d)(2) (1966).
8. 17 T.C. 652 (1951). Cf. Commissioner v. LoBue, 351 U.S. 243 (1956); Commissioner
v. Smith, 324 U.S. 177 (1945).
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fair market value as a result of restrictions upon their sale.9 The
restrictions terminated on December 31, 1943. In February and
March 1944, the firm sold the stock and reported the excess of the
amount realized over cost as a long-term capital gain. Lehman reported his share of the gain as a partner of the firm. The Commissioner contended that the firm realized ordinary income at the time
the restrictions lapsed to the extent that the fair market value of
the shares at the time the restrictions lapsed exceeded their cost.
The court held that the termination of the restrictions was not a
taxable event10 since there was no "sale or other disposition" of the
stock under the predecessor of section 1001.11 Furthermore, the
entire gain upon sale of the stock was properly reported as longterm capital gain.12 Thus the holding in Lehman favored the taxpayer both as to timing of income recognition and the type of
income recognized.13
The Commissioner's initial acquiescence in Lehman was withdrawn14 after the promulgation of the regulations to section 421.15
Reflecting the Commissioner's objections to Lehman, the regulations
provided that the lapse of the restrictions would be a taxable event
producing ordinary income and that the later sale would be entitled
to capital gains treatment.16 In general, under the regulations, an
individual who received property subject to restrictions having a
significant effect on the property's value, whether he received the
property as the result of a stock option17 or as a direct payment from
the employer,18 was deemed to have realized ordinary income at
the time the restrictions lapsed. The amount of income was the
lower of the value of the property at the time he received it, computed as if the restrictions did not exist, or the value at the time the
restrictions lapsed, in either case reduced by the amount the em9. 17 T.C. at 653. The Tax Court did not discuss the nature of the restrictions,
and the only information given was that they lasted from February 1, 1943, to December 31, 1943. 17 T.C. at 653.
10. 17 T.C. at 654.
11. Int, Rev. Code of 1939, § 111. Conceptually, the court's view of the termination
of restrictions seems analogous to the tax treatment of property on which a zoning
restriction is removed. While there may be an immediate and substantial increase in
the value of the property, there is no taxable event until sale or other disposition.
12. 17 T.C. at 654.
13. Compare Harold H. Kuchman, 18 T.C. 154 (1952), acquiesced in 1952-2 CUM.
BULL. 2 (restricted stock acquired had no ascertainable fair market value, so no income
to petitioner; issue of taxability upon lapse of restrictions not reached).
14. 1962-2 CuM. BULL. 7, withdrawing acquiescence in 1952-1 CUM. BULL. 3 and
substituting nonacquiescence.
15. T .D. 6416, 1959-2 CUM. BULL. 126.
16. See Treas. Reg. §§ l.61-2(d)(5), l.421-6(d) (1966).
17. Treas. Reg. § l.421-6(d)(2) (1966).
18. Treas. § l.61-2(d)(5) (1966). This provision applied generally to restricted property given in compensation, incorporating by reference the regulations under § 421
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ployee had paid for the property.19 This rule, by allowing date
of receipt to set a ceiling on ordinary income, tended to maximize
the capital gain element of restricted property.
To remedy this preferential tax treatment, and as part of a continuing effort to attain uniform treatment of property transferred
in connection ·with the performance of services,20 the Treasury
Department in 1968 issued proposed regulations21 which would
have caused the recipient to include in gross income the excess of
the fair market value over the cost on the date the restrictions
lapsed, without any reference to the possible lower value when the
property was received. The regulations were never promulgated22
because the Tax Reform Act of 1969 in essence codified these
proposed regulations in section 83 of the Code.
The genesis of the title of the new section is indicative of its
fundamental purpose. Originally labeled "Restricted Property" in
the House bill,23 it was changed in the Senate bill to "Property
Transferred in Connection with Performance of Services."24 Although the provision is aimed at restricted property, it is drafted
to provide, for the first time, an express Code section for compensation paid in kind, irrespective of any restrictions, and irrespective
of whether received under a stock option, deferred compensation,
or some alternative arrangement.
I. TAX

EFFECT UPON THE EMPLOYEE

Under section 83(a), a person who receives property either directly or through a beneficiary25 in connection with the performance
of services must include an amount in gross income when the rights
of the person having the beneficial interest in such property are
transferable or are not subject to a substantial risk of forfeiture,
whichever comes earlier. Although the conditions for inclusion in
income are ·written in the alternative, the statute expressly provides
that property rights are "transferable" only if the rights of the
dealing with stock options. Future citations concerning previous law will be to the latter
provisions alone.
19. Treas. Reg. § 1.421-6(d)(2)(i) (1966).
20. This attempt to achieve unified treatment is indicated by the Treasury Depart•
ment's issuance of proposed regulations and amendments to regulations under INT,
REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 61, 83, 162, 402(b), 403(c)-(d), 404(a)(5), 421, '721. See Proposed
Treas. Reg., 33 Fed. Reg. 158'70 (1968), as corrected by 34 Fed, Reg, 39'7 (1969), witlldrawn, 36 Fed. Reg. 10787 (1971).
21. Proposed Treas. Reg. § I.421-6(d), 33 Fed. Reg. 15870 (1968),
22. See 36 Fed. Reg. 10787 (1971).
23. H.R. 13270, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. § 321 (1969) (House Ways and Means Comm,
version).
24. H.R. 13270, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. § 321 (1969) (Senate Finance Comm. version),
25. See text accompanying notes 54-55 infra.
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transferee in such property are not subject to a substantial risk of
forfeiture. 26 The statute further defines "substantial risk of for£eiture" as a conditioning of the rights of full enjoyment of property
upon future per£ormance of substantial services by any individual.27
These definitional limitations diminish the independent significance of the term "transferability." Nevertheless, some independent
significance remains. If property was given to an employee in a
manner that would enable him to transfer it to a bona fide purchaser
free of restriction to the transferee, then the tax arises the moment
the employee receives the property, even though the property in
the employee's hands is subject to a substantial risk of for£eiture. 28
However, if the restriction imposes upon the transferee a substantial risk of for£eiture conditioned upon the employee's continued
services, then no tax would arise until the risk of forfeiture is lifted
from either the employee or the transferee.
If a recipient disposes of property before "for£eitable" restrictions lapse in an arm's length transaction, realization will occur at
the time of disposition.29 In the case of a transfer of restricted property which is not at arm's length, the proposed regulations to section
83 indicate the probable tax treatment of this transaction.30 The
example given is employee X, pursuant to an option, purchasing
restricted stock for $50, the fair market value in 1971 being $100.
Later in the year, he sells the stock to his ·wife for $10. When the
restrictions lapse in 1972, the fair market value of the stock is $120.
X would recognize taxable gross income of $10 in 1971. In 1972,
he recognizes taxable gross income of $60. This is computed by
taking the fair market value ($120) less the amount paid ($50), less
the amount already taxed ($10). In this case, the wife would still
be subject to the restrictions on the property at the time of transfer,
so this result is consistent with the definition of transferability in
section 83(c)(2). If this transfer to the wife was a gift, X would not
recognize any income in 1971, and would recognize $70 in 1972
when the restrictions lapsed ($120 fair market value less the $50
paid for the stock).
The amount included in gross income is the fair market value
at the date such property must be included in gross income less any
26. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 83(c)(2).
27. INT. REv. CoDE OF 1954, § 83(c)(l).
28. The Senate Report states that
an interest in property is to be considered to be transferable only if a transferee
would not be subject to forfeitability conditions-for example, where the employee
has a forfeitable interest in stock, but the fact of forfeitability is not indicated on
the stock. certificate, and a transferee would have no notice of it.
S. REP. No. 91-552, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 119, 122 (1969).
29. !NT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 83(a).
30. Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.83-l(c), 36 Fed. Reg. 10789 (1971).
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amount paid for the property. 31 "Fair market value" is determined
without regard to the effect of any restrictions with the single exception that the effect of a restriction "which by its terms will never
lapse" will be taken into account.32 The reason for this exception is
that Congress felt that this type of restriction was not tax-motivated
and should be distinguished from restrictions designed to achieve
deferral for tax-saving purposes.33
From the employee's perspective, the new provision is not as
favorable as the rules under prior law. Under prior law the matter
was dealt with in the regulations under sections 6l(a)(l) and 421.
These regulations provided that if property was transferred as com•
pensation for services, and if the property was subject to a restriction
which had a significant effect on value, nothing was included in
income upon receipt of the property. If the employee continued to
hold the property, realization was deferred until the restriction
lapsed. The amount included at that time was the lesser of the fair
market value of the property at the time of transfer without regard
to the restriction, or the fair market value at the time of the lapse
of the restriction, less the amount paid for the property.34
Revenue Ruling 68-8635 and the pre-section 83 case of Ira Hirsch 30
made it clear that even a temporary restriction preventing sale or
other disposition could be considered to have a significant effect on
value. As a result there was an increase in the number of restricted
stock plans under the previous regulations. These plans were attractive as an employee benefit because they permitted the employee
to obtain the status of an investor, entitled to capital gain treatment
on future appreciation beginning at the time of the transfer of the
stock, and, in addition, permitted deferred recognition of income
until he was free to sell the stock.
In contrast, although restrictions against sale had a significant
effect on value under prior law, they would not be considered
forfeitable under section 83(c)(l) of the Code since no future services are required as a condition of ownership. Deferral of recognition
requires both restrictions on transferability and risk of forfeiture. 37
The new statute narrows the circumstances under which deferred
recognition of compensation income will be permitted. In addition,
when recognition is deferred, capital gains treatment for appreciation
31. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 83(a).
32. INT. REv. ConE OF 1954, § 83(a}(l). See also S. REP. No. 91-552, supra note 28,
at 121.
33. See H.R. REP. No. 91-413, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 86, 88 (1969); S. REP. No.
91-552, supra note 28, at 121.
34. Treas. Reg. § l.421-6(d)(2) (1966).
35. 1968-1 CUM. Buu.. 184.
36. 51 T.C. 121 (1968).
37. INT. REv. CoDE OF 1954, § 83(a).
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between the time of transfer of property and the lapse of restriction
is eliminated.
As indicated by the Ways and Means Committee report, the
purpose of section 83 ·was to eliminate the "more generous" tax
treatment afforded the transfer of restricted property.38 Congress
sought to channel the transfer of restricted property into previously
recognized statutory patterns applicable to other forms of noncash
compensation. When property is transferred subject to restrictions
of a nonforfeitable type, the proper analogy was thought to be a
nonforfeitable contribution to an individual's account in a nonqualified employees' pension or profit-sharing trust. 89 Under section
402(b), the employee would immediately be taxed on such contribution at ordinary income rates even though the funds might be
beyond his reach for years. As to forfeitable stock, the proper
analogy was thought to be deferred compensation arrangements.
One example of this would be phantom stock plans under which
the employee would defer income until his rights vested, at which
time he would receive payment. At that time, when he had received
the deferred compensation and it was no longer subject to forfeiture,
the employee would be taxed on the property's full value and it
would be included in gross income and taxed at the ordinary income
rates.40 The new rules reflect these analogies.
The Senate Finance Committee added section 83(b), which allows
recipients of restricted property to elect, within thirty days from
date of transfer, to treat it as compensation in the year it is received,
even though it is not transferable and is subject to a substantial
risk of forfeiture. 41 In this manner an employee may qualify future
appreciation as capital gain, rather than ordinary income, even
while the property is forfeitable.
This potential tax benefit is not without risk. Section 83(b) provides that if an election is made and the property is subsequently
forfeited, then "no deduction shall be allowed in respect of such
forfeiture."42 It has been noted that the literal language of the provision could be read to preclude a deduction not only in regard to
amounts included in income but also in regard to any amount actually paid for the property (for example, if the property was purchased under a favorable option).48 The proposed regulations to
section 83 preclude this unfair result, providing expressly that a
forfeiture shall be treated as a disposition, upon which loss is recog38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

H.R. REP. No. 91-413 supra note 33, pt. 1, at 86.
id. at 86-88.
Treas. Reg. § l.61·2(d)(5) (1966); Buchhelder, supra note 1, at 673-74.
S. REP. No. 91-552, supra note 28, at 123.
INT, REv. CoDE OF 1954, § 83(b){l).
See Kelsey 8: Buckheit, supra note 1, at 261.

See
See
See
See
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nized equal to the excess of the amount paid for the property over
any amount realized upon forfeiture. 44 Another risk is that the fair
market value of the property will decline after the election under
section 83(b). The proposed regulations deal with the problem of
trying to recoup some of this loss through the less favorable method
of a capital loss. The basis of the property when the sale comes after
the restrictions have lapsed is the amount actually paid for the property and the amount included under section 83(b). If the sale is
before any restriction has lapsed and there is a loss, the basis is only
the amount actually paid.45 The apparent justification for this rather
unusual distinction is the preservation of the integrity of the provision prohibiting a loss deduction in the event of a forfeiture. Thus
a recipient cannot sell his property and take a large capital loss
shortly before he would have forfeited the stock. The more fundamental question is why eliminate the loss deduction at all since the
recipient has reported the property as compensation. Evidently the
provision reflects congressional sentiment that the right to take such
an election and with it the prospect of larger long-term capital gain
upon sale should be accompanied by some risk of nondeductible loss.
Whether this belief is founded in some rational policy is unclear.
Finally, section 83(£) prescribes the holding period for property
to which subsection (a) applies. The holding period begins when the
taxpayer's rights in the property are either transferable or are not
subject to a substantial risk of forfeiture. In contrast, under previous
law the holding period began at the time of transfer of the property
to the employee.46
II.

TAX TREATMENT OF THE EMPLOYER

The tax treatment of the party who pays compensation in property is governed by section 83(h), which provides that "there shall be
allowed as a deduction under section 162" the amount included in
the gross income of the person who performs the services. But under
this section that party is allowed the deduction only when the person
performing the services includes the amount in his income. Thus
deduction under section 162 is delayed until the risk of forfeiture
is lifted or the interest in the property is transferable.
One commentator has suggested that the statute's express provision that a deduction "shall be allowed" under section 162 in the
amount included in the income of the taxpayer appears to make the
44. Proposed Treas. Reg. § l.83-2(a), 36 Fed. Reg. 10789-90 (1971).
45. Proposed Treas. Reg. § l.83-2(a), 36 Fed. Reg. 10789-90 (1971).
46. See Treas. Reg. § l.421-6(d)(2)(i) (1966). This regulation dates the holding period from the time of exercise of the option. Since the employee was taxed on the
lesser of the fair market value at the time of exercise or at the time the restrictions
lapsed, the differential was eligible for capital gain treatment in any subsequent sale
of the property. Section 83 now eliminates this possibility.
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usual "reasonable allowance" limitation of section 162(a)(l) inapplicable.47 But despite the statute's literal language, a more likely
interpretation is that the employer must fulfill all requirements of
section 162, including the "reasonable allowance" limitation, in
order to obtain a deduction under section 83(h). The legislative
history suggests an intention only to eliminate preferential tax treatment regarding the transfer of restricted property,48 and an interpretation of section 83(h) which would expand the established
limitations on permissible trade or business expense deductions
under section 162 appears unfounded.
This conclusion that all the requirements of section 162 must
be met takes on greater significance in light of a recent revenue
ruling49 disallowing a deduction under section 162. The Internal
Revenue Service contended that a willful payment of salaries in excess of the maximums set by the wage-price control guidelines cannot
be deducted because such payment is punishable by fine and thus a
deduction would contravene section 162(c)(2).50 Assuming that this
ruling will be upheld by the courts, a holding that section 83(h)
must be read literally would mean that an employer could circumvent the ruling's limitations simply by compensating his employees
·with property rather than with cash. This possibility alone should
be enough to cause courts to require that all requirements of section
162 be met before a deduction will be allowed.
The new rules improve the after-tax impact of restricted stock
plans for employers by accelerating the deduction in the case of
nonforfeitable restrictions, and by increasing the amount of deduction in the case of forfeitable restrictions. This is because under
prior law, the deduction allowed the employer in the case of forfeitable restrictions was the lesser of the fair market value of the
property, without regard to the restriction, at the time of transfer
or the fair market value at the time the restrictions lapsed. 51 Under
present law the employer will benefit from any appreciation in value
through an increased deduction. If the property declines in value
he will receive the same deduction that he would have under previous law. In the case of nonforfeitable restrictions, since present law
taxes these at the time of transfer the employer ·will receive his
deduction then. Previously he had to wait until the nonforfeitable
47. D. HERWI'IZ, BUSINESS PLANNING 149 (Supp. 1971).
48. See H.R. REP. No. 91-413, supra note 33, pt. 1, at 86-87; S. REP. No. 91-552,
supra note 28, 120-21.
49. Rev. Rul. 72-236, 1972 INT. REv. Buu.. No. 20, at 7.
50. INT. REv. CoDE OF 1954, § 162(c)(2), as amended by Revenue Act of 1971, Pub. L.
No. 92-178, § 310(a), 85 Stat. 497, provides: "No deduction shall be allowed ••• for
any payment ••• made, directly or indirectly, to any person, if the payment constitutes
••• [an] illegal payment under any law of the United States ••• which subjects the
payor to a criminal penalty ••••"
51. Treas. Reg. § 1.421-6(£) (1966).
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restrictions lapsed if the nonforfeitable restriction was deemed to
have a significant effect on value. With respect to forfeitable stock,
section 83(h) allows the employer to deduct full value, including
any appreciation, when the restrictions lapse.
Despite these accelerated deduction benefits to employers, the
new rules may not operate to their benefit. Assuming that employees
are ultimately concerned with after-tax income, and in light of the
fact that section 83 is less favorable to the employees than prior law,
employers may be forced to provide a greater magnitude of benefits
to their executives in order to give an after-tax income equivalent
to that obtainable under prior law. Increased compensation costs to
the employer may more than offset benefits from the new rules
relating to deductions.

III.

THE SCOPE OF SECTION 83 AND SOME PROBLEMS
UNDER THE NEW RULES

A. If in Connection with the Performance of Services
Section 83(a) states that income results to the person who performs the services when property is transferred "in connection with"
services rather than when property is transferred "as compensation
for" services. This language includes within its coverage property
transferred to an independent contractor. Surely it is not intended
to override the standards for a gift e..xclusion under section 102
enunciated by the Supreme Court in Commissioner v. Duberstein.G2
If the transferor's intention is essentially donative, proceeding from
a "detached and disinterested generosity,"G3 then income should be
excluded under section 102 even though literally it may have been
transferred "in connection with the performance of services."
B.

Transfer to a Person Other Than the One Who
Performs the Services

Section 83(a) provides that if property is transferred to any
person (except the person for whom the services were performed)
and the requirements of section 83 are met, income will result to
the person who performed the services. This preserves the assignment-of-income principles of Lucas v. Earl.G4 The employee will
be taxed if the employer transfers property to a third party in recognition of the employee's services. 55
52.
53.
54.
55.

363 U.S. 278 (1960).
363 U.S. at 285, quoting Commissioner v. LoBue, 351 U.S. 243, 246 (1956),
281 U.S. 111 (1930).
Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.83-3(£), 36 Fed. Reg. 10791 (1971).

Notes
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The Fair Market Value of Such Property

One prerequisite to determining an amount to be included in
gross income under section 83(a) is to ascertain the fair market value
of the property without regard to any restrictions except those which
by their terms will never lapse. The Internal Revenue Service has
generally contended that property received for services lacks an ascertainable fair market value only in "rare and extraordinary
cases." 66 Options, however, are often almost impossible to value.
For this reason, section 83(e)(3) expressly provides that the new rules
shall not apply to the transfer of an option ·without a "readily
ascertainable fair market value." The proposed regulations state
that the value of an option is ordinarily not readily ascertainable
unless the option is actively traded on an established market. 57
One final valuation matter is that section 83(d)(l) provides that
if a "no lapse" restriction allows the transferee to sell the property
only at a price determined under a formula, the formula price shall
be deemed to be the fair market value of the property, unless the
Service establishes otherwise, with the burden of proof on the Service. Congress felt that such a restriction is an inherent limitation
on the recipient's property rights, and that his income should be
determined accordingly. 58

D. Determined Without Regard to Any Restrictions
The computation of fair market value without regard to restrictions raises the question whether income can be measured for taxation in an amount greater than the actmtl present fair market value
of the property received. Eisner v. Macomber5 9 established the principle that Congress may only impose tax upon realized "income"
under the sixteenth amendment. Under the definition of income
set forth in Macomber, and assuming that even nonforfeitable restrictions decrease the value of property received, it is arguable that
gain has not been "derived" on the total market value without
respect to restrictions. 60
The Supreme Court has stated, however, that the Macomber
definition of income "was not meant to provide a touchstone to all
future gross income questions." 61 It is unlikely, therefore, that a
court would find the section in violation of the realization doctrine
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

Treas. Reg. § l.lO0l(a) (1957); Rev. Rul. 58-402, 1958-2 CUM. Buu.. 15.
Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.83-7(b), 36 Fed. Reg. 10793 (1971).
S. REP. No. 91-552, supra note 28, at 121.
252 U.S. 189 (1920). See also Stanton v. Baltic Mining Co., 240 U.S. 103 (1916).
See 252 U.S. at 207.
Commissioner v. Glensbaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 430-31 (1955).
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in light of the policies underlying section 83. In an attempt to force
all deferred compensation arrangements through statutorily approved, nondiscriminatory plans, Congress has removed the tax
advantages allowed previously in the nonstatutory methods. Under
sections 421-25, Congress has set out the requirements for nondiscriminatory plans which receive favorable tax treatment. While
Congress has not completely forbidden the use of discriminatory
restricted stock plans, it has made the policy judgment that deferred
tax treatment will not be allowed when the property is not subject
to a substantial risk of forfeiture or is transferable. Even in the
case of property subject to forfeiture and nontransferable, Congress
took away a portion of the former advantages of these plans by taxing the entire amount as ordinary income rather than allowing
capital gains treatment from the date of exercise.62 This is consistent
·with other areas of tax law in which discriminatory plans are allowed.63 Congress has tried to ensure equal tax treatment of all
deferred compensation arrangements, and since these tax policies
have not been assailed as unconstitutional in other contexts, it is
unlikely that such an assault on section 83 would be upheld. Moreover, when there are two possible constructions, only one of which
would render the statute unconstitutional, the construction sustaining the constitutionality will prevail.64 I£ faced with a case where the
doctrine of realization appears to be contravened, the courts could
construe the substantial risk of forfeiture test of section 83(c)(l) to
encompass the challenged restriction, thereby deferring taxation
within the purview of the statutory scheme and rendering the issue
of realization moot.

E. Substantial Risk of Forfeiture
Section 83(c)(l) provides that the rights of a person are subject
to a substantial risk of forfeiture "if such person's rights to full
enjoyment of such property are conditioned upon the performance
of substantial services by an individual." This, according to the
Senate Finance Committee, was not intended as an exclusive definition.65 A Finance Committee press release indicated that the substan62. INT. REv. CoDE OF 1954, § 83(a).
63. A primary example is the tax treatment given nonqualified pension, profit.
sharing, and stock bonus plans. If the contribution to such a plan is vested, the employee will include in his ordinary income the contributions of the employer, even
though he may have to wait forty years or more until he receives the property. INT.
R.Ev. ConE OF 1954, § 402(b). However, if the contribution is forfeitable when made,
even though it later becomes nonforfeitable, the employee will not pay any tax until
actual distributions are made. See Treas. Reg. § l.402(b)·l(a) (1956).
64. See United States v. Bennett, 232 U.S. 299, 303 (1914); Stratton's Independence,
Ltd. v. Howbert, 231 U.S. 399 (1913).
65. S. REP. No. 91-552, supra note 28, at 121.
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tial risk of forfeiture exists only if the employer can compel the
employee, or other holder, to return the identical property.66
There is certainly a gray area in which it is difficult to determine
whether a restriction involves a "substantial risk of forfeiture." For
example, what is meant by "performance of substantial services by an
individual"? Is continued employment for six months substantial?
Two years? Five years? There may also be a problem whether the
event which causes the return of the restricted property amounts to
a "forfeiture." For example, is a requirement that the employee return the property in exchange for the fair market value at the time
of return a forfeiture? A proposed regulation lists some of the circumstances that may be taken into account in determining whether
property is subject to a substantial risk of forfeiture: employee's age,
availability of alternative employment opportunities, likelihood of
obtaining other employment, employee's degree of skill, employee's
health, and the practice of the employer. 67
Advance rulings will not be available for employers to determine
whether planned restrictions constitute a "substantial risk of forfeiture. "68 The vagueness of the standard is not necessarily a defect in
drafting, as Congress may have intended the provision to have an
in terrorem effect in order to discourage the transfer of restricted
property.

F. Restrictions Which Will Never Lapse
The no-lapse rule of section 83(d)(l) was probably intended to
deal with the type of restriction often found in closely-held corporations requiring sale at a formula price when the shareholder leaves
the employ of the corporation, retires, or dies. A restriction which
never lapses is defined in the proposed regulations as
(I) A limitation on the subsequent transfer of proper-ty transferred
in connection with the performance of services,
(2) Which allows the transferee of the property to sell such property
at a price determined under a formula, and
(3) Which ·will continue to apply to, and to be enforced against any
subsequent holder (other than the transferor).69

A requirement resulting in substantial risk of forfeiture, however,
will not be considered to result in a no-lapse restriction. 70 It can be
66. SENATE Cor.n,r. ON FINANCE, 9lsr CoNG., lsr SESS., TAX REFORM Am: OF 1969;
COMPILATION OF DECISIONS REACHED IN ExEcUTIVE SESSION 17 (Comm. Print 1969) (Press
Release, Oct. 14, 1969).
67. Proposed Treas. Reg. § l.83-3(c), 36 Fed. Reg. 10790 (1971).
68. Rev. Proc. 69-6, 1969-1 Cm.r. BULL. 396.
69. Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.83-5, 36 Fed. Reg. 10792 (1971).
70. Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.83-5, 36 Fed. Reg. 10792 (1971).
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expected that troublesome issues will arise in drawing the line between forfeitable restrictions and restrictions which never lapse.71
Section 83(d)(2) provides for realization of income when a restriction which never lapses is cancelled. If cancellation occurs, the
employee ·will be taxed on the element of compensation which escaped taxation under ordinary income rates when the property was
originally transferred. This rule does not apply if the employee can
establish that the cancellation was not compensatory and that the
person who would be entitled to a deduction if it were compensatory
will not treat the transaction as compensatory.
If the property is subject to both a substantial risk of forfeiture
and a restriction which never lapses and the cancellation of the latter
occurs before the substantial risk of forfeiture lapses, an interpretive
problem arises under section 83(d)(2). The provision is not limited
expressly to a situation where only a restriction which never lapses
exists prior to cancellation. The amount determined as compensation is the excess of the fair market value (computed without regard
to "the restrictions") at the time of cancellation, over the fair market
value immediately prior to cancellation (computed by taking "the
restriction" into account) and the amount, if any, paid for cancellation. If "the restrictions" includes even forfeitable restrictions, then
83(d)(2) might seem to impose a tax, notwithstanding the continuing
existence of a substantial risk of forfeiture. Such a result seems contrary to the thrust of section 83(a) and the congressional intention
to defer compensation where a substantial risk of forfeiture exists.
Thus 83(d)(2) might well be construed to be inapplicable so long as
a substantial risk of forfeiture remains.
It has been suggested that a tax advantage might be obtained
71. Compare S. REP. No. 91-552, supra note 28, at 121: "a requirement that an
employee sell his stock back to his employer at book value or some other reasonable
price if he terminates his employment" is an example of a restriction that never
lapses, with INT. REv. Co»E OF 1954, § 83(c)(l): "The rights of a person in property
are subject to a substantial risk of forfeiture if such person's rights to full enjoyment
of such property are conditioned upon the future performance of substantial services
by any individual."
One commentator has noted:
Perhaps the critical point in the Senate Report is the reference to a "reasonable
price," so that forfeitability would depend upon how far from market value the
resale price was. But unless there is some significant difference bet'lveen the resale
price and market value, the resale requirement is hardly a restriction worth taking
into account at all; indeed, the pre-1969 regulations specifically stated that a re•
striction requiring resale of stock to the employer at fair market value was not a
restriction having a significant effect on value. On the other hand, if forfeitability
is to turn on how large the difference between the resale price and fair market
value is, a very troublesome uncertainty would be introduced into a statutory
pattern that was supposed to bring a high degree of predictability.
D. HER.WITZ, supra note 47, at 146.
It has also been suggested that the example given in the Senate Report may allow
some element of compensation income to escape inclusion in ordinary income if tltc
resale condition becomes operative only by voluntary termination of employment and
not by death or normal retirement. Id. at 146-47.
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through the transfer of property subject to a no-lapse restriction in
anticipation of sharp appreciation, perhaps by virtue of a foreseeable
public offering.72 Since no-lapse restrictions are taken into account
in determining the measure of compensation income at time of transfer, the employee might be given substantial opportunity for capital
gain while holding ordinary income to a minimum. A difficulty in
this approach is that Congress excepted no-lapse restrictions from the
general rule that restrictions are not considered in determining the
value of nonforfeitable property because no-lapse restrictions were
considered "not tax-motivated." 73 Thus, despite the literal language
of the statute, it could be argued that an obviously tax-motivated
72. [T]here may still be some advantages in arrangements involving restrictions
which never lapse ••• particularly in situations where stock is expected to appreciate
sharply, perhaps by virtue of a foreseeable public offering or the like, and the purpose of the arrangement is to make it possible for an employee to acquire substantially more stock than he could afford even at the current value. Suppose, for example, a corporation has 50,000 shares outstanding, with a current value of $10 per
share, and because of prospects that the stock might be worth as much as $30 per
share in the not too distant future the corporation wishes to make 5000 shares available to a key employee who has only limited outside resources. The shares might be
issued to the employee subject to a perpetual restriction that prior to any sale or
transfer of the shares the employee must offer them to the corporation at, say, $8
less than the current fair market value. Assuming that this does not constitute
forfeitability ••• the stock would be included in the employee's income upon receipt; but since the stock is subject to a restriction which never lapses, the restriction would be taken into account in valuing the stock at the time of receipt.
Whether this restriction would reduce the current fair value of this stock all the
way down to $2 per share is not clear. Under § 83(d)(l) a perpetual restriction
"which allows the transferee to sell such property only at a price determined under
a formula" fixes the fair value at that price, unless the Government can sustain
the burden of proving the contrary. Assuming that pegging the price at $8 less
than fair market value represents a "formula", does a right of first refusal in the
corporation constitute a restriction "which allows the transferee to sell such property only at" the formula price? Theoretically, the answer would seem to be "no",
since if the corporation does not exercise its right of first refusal the employee
would be free to sell to others at full value. But as a practical matter the corporation is virtually certain to take advantage of such a bargain price (absent some
legal restriction on the repurchase of stock). Moreover, this would seem to be the
type of restriction contemplated by § 83(d)(l); indeed, one that literally conformed
to the words of that provision and flatly prevented the employee in perpetuity
from selling to anyone except at a formula price below market value would leave
the employee in a position to decide whom he wished to favor with this bargain
purchase, which would in and of itself be an indirect form of value to the employee. In any event, even if a right of first refusal does not fix the value of the
stock under § 83(d)(l), it would be likely to reduce the value to a figure close
to the formula price; though the recipient of the stock is not required to sell
and can therefore enjoy the full value of the other elements of the stock, the fact
remains that at least in the case of a minority interest in a publicly-held stock,
the price at which the stock can be sold is the dominant factor in valuation. Assummg a $2 value for the stock when received, and assuming further that the
stock was issued for only nominal consideration, the employee would have to pay
ta." on compensation income of only approximately $10,000 as the price of being
able to reap the rewards of appreciation at capital gains rates on 5,000 shares; without the restriction the same tax bite would be incurred upon the receipt of a
mere 1000 shares.
D. HERwrrz, supra note 47, at 147-48.
Additional benefits from the use of no-lapse restrictions may arise from the usual
power of the corporation to cancel the restrictions, if carefnl timing is exercised. See
id. at 148.
73. S. REP. No. 91-552, supra note 28, at 121.
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no-lapse restriction should not be held to be a "restriction which will
never lapse:• for purposes of section 83. On the other hand, Congress
arguably made a judgment regarding no-lapse restrictions as a class,
and thus case-by-case inquiry into motive may be unwarranted.
G.

Nonexempt Trusts and Nonqualified Annuities

Under prior law, if an employer contributed an amount to a nonqualified employee trust or annuity, and the employee's rights were
nonforfeitable, the employee was required to include the full amount
of the contribution in income at the time it was made.74 If the employee's rights were forfeitable, the employee was not taxed until
he received actual payment.75 The employer was allowed a deduction for nonforfeitable contributions made in the year paid.70
Under section 402(b) and section 403(c) and (d), if a previously
forfeitable contribution became vested, the employee was not ta.xed
until he actually received payment.77 In this case, and in the case
where the contribution was forfeitable, the employer would not
receive any deduction.78
The Tax Reform Act of 1969 placed the tax treatment upon
expiration of the forfeitable restriction under section 83 so that the
employee will be taxed when the contribution becomes nonforfeitable.79 The Finance Committee report indicates that this will end
the Service's contention that the employer is not entitled to a deduction when the contribution becomes nonforfeitable, even though this
meant that he would never receive a deduction.80 The employer is
now permitted to take a deduction in the ta.xable year in which the
employee includes the compensation in his gross income.81
H.

Transactions to Which the New Rules Are Not Applicable

Section 83(d)(l) provides that the new rules are not applicable to
a transaction to which the qualified stock option provision, section
421, applies. Section 421 contains the rules governing qualified stock
options, employee stock purchase plans, and restricted stock options,
and sets stringent requirements to qualify for favorable tax treatment. Except for a case in which the option price is less than the
fair market value of the stock, no ordinary income is realized at the
time of either grant or exercise, and the employer is not entitled to
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

Treas. Reg. §§ I.402(b)-l(a), l.403(c)-l(a), l.403(d)-l(a)-(b) (1964).
See authorities cited in note 74 supra.
Treas. Reg. § 1.404(a)-l(c) (1964).
Treas. Reg. §§ l.402(b)-l(a), l.403(c)-l(a), l.403(d)-l(a)-(b) (1964).
Treas. Reg. § 1.404(a)-12 (1964).
INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 402(b).
S. REP. No. 91-552, supra note 28, at 123.
INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 83(h).
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a deduction under section 162.82 When the stock is disposed of, the
employee will be entitled to capital gain treatment on the appreciation of the stock between the time of exercise and the time of sale.83
Section 83(e)(2) states that the new rules are not applicable to a
trust under a qualified pension, profit-sharing or stock bonus plan
described in section 401(a), or a transfer under an annuity plan
which meets the requirements of section 404(a)(2).
As noted above, section 83(e)(3) makes the section inapplicable
to the transfer of an option without a readily ascertainable fair market value.84 Section 83(e)(4) provides that the section shall not apply
to the transfer of property pursuant to the exercise of an option with
a readily ascertainable fair market value at date of· grant. The purpose of these complementary provisions is to ensure that the compensation element of property or options transferred will be taxed
at ordinary income rates at one time only.85

I.

Tax Free Exchanges

Section 83(g) covers the treatment of property received in certain
tax free exchanges for restricted property to which the general restricted property rule applies. When the property received is subject
to restrictions and conditions substantially similar to those to which
the property given up was subject, the exchange is to be disregarded for purposes of section 83(a). The property to be received
in effect replaces the traded property as restricted property in the
hands of the recipient subject to the provisions of se~tion 83.

IV.

CONCLUSION

Section 83 will, to a large extent, accomplish its primary purpose of making the tax consequences uniform in cases of deferred
compensation, regardless of the form of the arrangement. In so doing,
however, Congress has severely diminished the ability of closely held
corporations to attract and keep management talent. The qualified
stock option plans are not attractive, as they are limited to indi82. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 42l(a), 422(c)(l).
83. Treas. Reg. § l.421·5(a)(4) (1961). The examples indicate that an employee must
hold the property for two years in order to qualify for the favorable tax treatment.
84. See text accompanying notes 56-57 supra.
85. If there is a transfer of an option without a readily ascertainable value, the
option will be taxed at exercise, if the property acquired upon exercise is not subject
to a substantial risk of forfeiture or is transferable. Treas. Reg. § l.421-6(d)(l) (1966).
If the property is subject to a substantial risk of forfeiture and is not transferable at
the time of exercise, section 83 will apply, and the person exercising the options will
not be taxed until the restrictions lapse. If the option has a readily ascertainable fair
market value, the recipient will include the excess of the value over cost in ordinary
income at the time the option is granted. Subsequent acquisition of property pursuant
to the option will not be a taxable event. At the time of sale, the recipient will receive
capital gain or loss treatment pursuant to the usual capital gain rules.
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viduals holding less than five per cent of the total combined voting
power or value of all stock of the corporation,86 and in many closely
held corporations, the majority of management personnel are also
major stockholders. The qualified pension, profit-sharing, and stock
bonus plans offer some help, but the closely held corporation may
have difficulty funding these plans.87 The best remaining avenue
for achieving their goals of compensating and keeping management
talent may well be through the provisions of section 83(b), which
will enable the corporation to transfer property conditioned on future employment to executives, and to have the executives elect to
include this income in the year of receipt. This would provide both
substantial security for the corporation in regard to continuity of
management and potential capital gains treatment for the employee
on future appreciation. On the other hand, employees may find this
approach undesirable since they run the risk of forfeiture and cannot use the stock to meet their immediate tax obligation.
86. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 422(b)(7). The 5% limitation applies to corporations
having more than $2,000,000 of equity capital; for smaller corporations the percentage
limitation varies with equity, but the maximum permissible ownership is 10%, Qualified stock option plans would seem to be of greatest advantage to the large publiclyheld corporations, in which stock ownership is widely dispersed. Its utility for the
closely held corporation would not seem to be that great, as the e.xecutives will often
exceed the 5% holdings limit in the case of corporations having more than $2,000,000
in equity capital, or the additional percentage allowed if there is less than $2,000,000
in equity capital.
87. INT, REv. CoDE OF 1954, §§ 401(a), 40l(d).

